A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...) , or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis. (shrink)

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these systems for natural language (...) indicative condi- tionals and bets on conditionals. Within our framework the so-called “defective” truth table, in which participants choose a third value when the antecedent of the indicative conditional is false, becomes a coherent response. We show that only de Finetti’s system has a good descriptive fit when uncer- tainty is the third value. (shrink)

Some people have found my distinction between meaning and significance useful. In the following revision of that distinction, I hope to improve its accuracy and perhaps, therefore, its utility as well. My impulse for making the revision has been my realization, very gradually achieved, that meaning is not simply an affair of consciousness and unconsciousness. In 1967, in Validity in Interpretation, I roundly asserted that “there is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness.” 1 That assertion would be true (...) if, godlike, we could oversee the whole of human consciousness, past, present, and future. But we language users, being limited creatures, intend our verbal meanings to go beyond what we can pay attention to at any moment. We intend our meanings to transcend our momentary limitations of attention and knowledge. Hence there is a land of meanings beyond past and present human consciousness—the land of the future. What I should have said originally is that there is no magic lance of meanings beyond the whole extent of human consciousness, past, present, and future. This correction of my original statements leads to a deepening of the concept of meaning.In 1960 I first proposed the analytical distinction between two aspects of textual interpretation. One of them, meaning, was fixed and immutable; the other, significance, was open to change.2 I acknowledged that significance, changeable or not, is the more valuable object of interpretation, because it typically embraces the present use of texts, and present use is present value. But I argued that, in academic criticism, the significance and use of a text ought to be rooted in its fixed meaning, since otherwise criticism would lack a stable object of inquiry and would merely float on tides of preference. The claim that one reader’s opinion is as valid as another’s would then be right, despite any indignant protest to the contrary. I did not wish to dissuade people from floating on the tides of preference if that was what they wished to do. I intended to provide a firm justification for those who wished to pursue historical scholarship. 3 I also assumed that even those who did not pursue historical scholarship might sometimes wish to exploit the possibility of historically fixed meaning. In my experience, even antiauthorial theorists sometimes with to regard their own texts as having a historically fixed meaning and will complain if someone misunderstands that meaning. 1. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, p. 4.2. See my “Objective Interpretation,” PMLA 75 : 463-79.3. See, for instance, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, which ends:We submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake: the way of biographical or genetic inquiry …. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem “Prufrock”; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle. [P. 18] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of numerous works, including Validity in Interpretation and The Aims of Interpretation. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Against Interpretation?”, “The Politics of Theories of Interpretation, and “Stylistics and Synonymity”. (shrink)

In recent years leading figures in a variety of fields - political, financial, medical, and organizational - have become acutely aware of the need to effectively incorporate aspects of risk into their decision-making. This book addresses a wide range of contemporary issues in decision research, such as how individuals deal with uncertainty and complexity, gender-based differences in decision-making, what determines decision performance and why people choose risky activities. The book presents results from academic research carried out over the last twenty (...) years. A common theme is the study of decisions made in horserace betting markets, a research medium which offers a rich insight into decision-making in general and one which enjoys particular methodological advantages over laboratory-based simulations. This set of naturalistic studies explores the variety of individual motivations for betting, how people perceive and respond to the presence of uncertainty, the challenges of complex and turbulent information and the use of heuristics as a response, how decision-making performance is affected by structural or process-related features of the decision environment, and how men and women differ in their decision behaviour. The authors’ interesting and novel findings offer a richer understanding of the psychological and economic underpinnings of betting behaviour which should inform practitioners, policymakers and regulators in an industry which is undergoing unprecedented global growth. The book is also relevant to courses covering subject areas such as financial markets, decision-making and behavioural finance. (shrink)

We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in (...) which the subject is presented with a range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some event that the subject has a belief over. Knowledge of the risk attitudes of subjects conditions the inferences about subjective beliefs. Maximum simulated likelihood methods are used to estimate a structural model in which subjects employ subjective beliefs to make bets. We present evidence that some subjective probabilities are indeed best characterized as probability distributions with non-zero variance. (shrink)

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

‘I Bet They Are Going to Read It’: Reported Direct Speech in Titles of Research Papers in Linguistic Pragmatics Titles of research articles in the humanities, including linguistics, tend to be more creative and less informative than corresponding titles in exact sciences or medicine. In linguistics, pragmatic studies are an area where reported discourse, i.e. direct speech in the form of a full speech act, occurs relatively frequently in titles of research papers. This paper analyses the metonymic and cataphoric relations (...) between such titles and article texts on the background of the functions of text titles. It also presents the results of a survey conducted among graduate students and aimed at finding out whether titles containing reported discourse in the form of speech acts are easier to memorize and attract more attention among the articles' potential readers. (shrink)

Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...) whereas the projection of ‘green’ is not. We thus have a justification for preferring the green induction over the grue induction. I do not think Freitag has solved the New Riddle. The problem is that his proposal tacitly assumes certain counterfactual claims that a grue-speaker would dispute. I thus argue that Freitag's claims beg the question against the grue-speaker, and I show why the grue-speaker would reject them. (shrink)

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows (...) that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet. (shrink)

Here, we propose that the heterogeneity of mutational types in populations underpins alternative pathways of evolutionary adaptation. Point mutations, deletions, insertions, transpositions and duplications cause different biological effects and provide distinct adaptive possibilities. Experimental evidence for this notion comes from the mutational origins of adaptive radiations in large, clonal bacterial populations. Independent sympatric lineages with different phenotypes arise from distinct genetic events including gene duplication, different insertion sequence movements and several independent point mutations. The breadth of the mutational spectrum in (...) the ancestral population should be viewed as a form of bet‐hedging, reducing the risk of evolutionary dead ends and complementing the phenotypic and epigenetic heterogeneities that improve the survival capabilities of a population. Different mutational events arise from distinct cellular processes and are subject to separate environmental impacts, so the availability of any particular type of mutation may constrain or promote adaptive pathways in populations. (shrink)

We consider here an important family of conditional bets, those that proceed to settlement if and only if some agreed evidence is received that a condition has been met. Despite an opinion widespread in the literature, we observe that when the evidence is strong enough to generate certainty as to whether the condition has been met or not, using traditional conditional probabilities for such bets will NOT preserve a gambler from having a synchronic Dutch Book imposed upon him. On the (...) contrary (I show) the gambler can be Dutch-Booked if his betting ratios ever depart from a rather different probability, one that involves the probability of the agreed evidence being provided. We note furthermore that this same alternative probability assessment is necessary if the evidence is weaker (i.e. if it fails to provide knowledge whether or not the condition has been met.) By contrast, some of the (rather different) probability assessments proposed by Jeffrey, precisely for such situations, still expose the gambler to a Dutch-Book. (shrink)

A condição humana e a condição docente: das ilusões de onipotência ao reconhecimento do desamparo Resumo: Partindo do princípio de que todo processo educacional é aberta ou veladamente guiado por uma determinada maneira de se compreender o ser humano, procuramos nesse artigo colocar em questão os ideais de “humano”, e consequentemente, de humano-professor, que a tradição ocidental nos legou. Em seguida, tentamos indicar alguns caminhos para repensarmos contemporaneamente o que significa ser humano e, por conseguinte, o que significa ser professor. (...) Enquanto os antigos ideais insistem em projeções de poder e invulnerabilidade ao assumir uma essência imaterial para o humano, apostamos numa concepção de humano encarnado, afetivo e desejante que envolve, em contrapartida, a disposição para assumirmos o irremediável desamparo e a incontornável vulnerabilidade que são intrínsecos à condição humana. Palavras-chave: condição humana; ilusões de onipotência; desamparo The human condition and the teacher condition: from the illusions of omnipotence to the recognition of helplessness: Assuming that every educational process is openly or veiled guided by a certain way of understanding the human being, we seek in this article to question the ideals of "human," and consequently of human-teacher, that the Western tradition bequeathed to us. Next, we try to indicate some ways to rethink contemporaneously what it means to be human and, therefore, what it means to be a teacher. While the old ideals insist on projections of power and invulnerability by assuming an immaterial essence for the human, we bet on an incarnate, affective and desiring human conception that involves, on the other hand, the disposition to assume the irremediable helplessness and the unavoidable vulnerability that are intrinsic to the human condition. Keywords: human condition; omnipotence illusions; helplessness La condición humana y la condición docente: de las ilusiones de omnipotencia al reconocimiento del desamparo Resumen: A partir del principio de que todo proceso educativo es abierto o veladamente guiado por una determinada manera de comprenderse el ser humano, buscamos en ese artículo plantear en cuestión los ideales de "humano", y consecuentemente, de humano-profesor, que la tradición occidental en legó. A continuación, intentamos indicar algunos caminos para repensar contemporáneamente lo que significa ser humano y, por lo tanto, lo que significa ser profesor. Mientras los antiguos ideales insisten en proyecciones de poder e invulnerabilidad al asumir una esencia inmaterial para lo humano, apostamos en una concepción de humano encarnado, afectivo y deseante que envuelve, en contrapartida, la disposición para asumir el irremediable desamparo y la ineludible vulnerabilidad que son intrínsecos a la condición humana. Palabras clave: condición humana; ilusiones de omnipotencia; desamparo Data de registro: 20/05/2020Data de aceite: 02/10/2020. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an appreciation of Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things reception, from the latest book by Ivan Domingues entitled “Foucault, a arqueologia e As palavras e as coisas: cinquenta anos depois” (Ed. UFMG, 2023). One of the scopes of the book is to examine the range of The Order of Things and its archaeological strategy to account for the presentation of the birth of human sciences, as well as its fragility and instability in (...) the face of a possible change in the disposition of knowledge. Or Episteme’s disposition, according to Foucault terminology, whose signs of change can be observed on the occasion of the advent, in the twentieth century, of Lacanian psychoanalysis, ethnology and structural linguistics. By privileging its repercussions, expansions and rectifications fifty years later, it is not intended to “correct” Foucault from an epistemological point of view, but to point out the fertility and power of his thoughts for posterity. It is about going through “fertile errors and anodyne truths” (DOMINGUES, 2020, p. 386). The bet is that possible gaps, errors or confusions identifiable by Foucault himself and by his critics at the time never invalidate the fertility of a discussion concerning human sciences, which were never the same after Foucault. (shrink)

L’article a pour objectif de rendre compte du réalisme critique introduit par le théologien Ian Barbour afin d’établir un « pont » entre science et théologie. Nous verrons pourquoi et comment Ian Barbour utilise cette philosophie qui relie le mieux, selon lui, l’ontologie et l’épistémologie pour proposer un dialogue voire une intégration entre science et théologie. Ce réalisme critique a ensuite été repris par d’autres scientifiques-théologiens notamment Peacocke et Polkinghorne avec quelques nuances qui sont ici analysées.

L’article a pour objectif de rendre compte du réalisme critique introduit par le théologien Ian Barbour afin d’établir un « pont » entre science et théologie. Nous verrons pourquoi et comment Ian Barbour utilise cette philosophie qui relie le mieux, selon lui, l’ontologie et l’épistémologie pour proposer un dialogue voire une intégration entre science et théologie. Ce réalisme critique a ensuite été repris par d’autres scientifiques-théologiens notamment Peacocke et Polkinghorne avec quelques nuances qui sont ici analysées.